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What we see and what we do 
not see in heath care
Fourteen years ago, US Inspector General and the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services conduced a detailed 
analysis of money outflow from the Medicare and Medic-
aid federal health care programs; their findings shocked 
the nation: US $23 billion was lost annually to different 
forms of fraud and corruption, reaching 14% of the total 
health budget for both federal programs (1). This crimi-
nal activity, formally termed ‘white-collar fraud,’ was car-
ried out through spectacular operation of falsifying and 
‘building up’ of invoices, opening of false firms, insurance 
fraud, charging non-existent laboratory and other tests, 
and other fairly complicated but extremely lucrative crimi-
nal ventures. Only a year after the first report, the amount 
lost to health care programs dropped to US $20.3 billion 
and to US $12.6 billion after two years (1), which can be 
ascribed to continuing analysis and money flow control, 
as well as detection and processing of fraud cases. Malcom 
Sparrow’s book License to Steal provides an analysis of the 
ways used to bleed money from the health care system 
and reveals a lucid truth: “What you see is not a problem. 
What you don’t see creates a serious damage to the sys-
tem, and the effectiveness of the control mechanisms is 
measured by how many invisible problems they discover 
and  prevent.”  Sparrow  detected  another  appalling  phe-
nomenon in health care – that many criminal groups, until 
recently concentrated on drug smuggling and other seri-
ous criminal deeds, have been redirecting their activities 
to health care fraud for two simple reasons – because it 
brings enormous monetary return and because the pun-
ishment for the acts, if they are discovered, are much more 
lenient  than  in ‘conventional’  street  or  organized  crime. 
Sparrow also states that, because the types of fraud em-
ployed are ingenious, an important task for the health care 
management is to develop a good control system so that 
the theft from the taxpayers and damage to the quality of 
the health care are reduced.
Fraud and corruption in the public health care is recognized 
at the global level and is perhaps the biggest contempo-
rary challenge to the financial management in health care. 
I write this in regard to the Medikol scandal that has been 
raging in Croatia, and has been branded by the media as 
“the biggest affair of Croatian health care.”
The essence of the affair, about which I have written a lot 
for the Croatian media (2,3) is the following:
1. A private entrepreneur (caterer) and his firm Medicol 
sign the first contract with the Croatian Institute of Health 
Insurance (CIHI) for the compensation for PET/CT diagnos-
tic examinations, which he installed at the premises rented 
from one of the hospitals in Zagreb, Sisters of Mercy Uni-
versity Hospital Center. The contract is lucrative and favor-
able for the private business, as Medikol charges HRK 9000 
(€ 1220, US $1800) for each of the contracted 4500 patients 
(total HRK 40.5 million). The previous cost of PET/CT scans 
for Croatian patients paid to institutions outside of Croatia 
by the CIHI was about HRK 10 million annually. A sudden 
jump in the system’s spending after the introduction of a 
private interest is obvious.
2. In the same year, Medikol sends the CIHI an outline of 
a “PET/CT Project for Croatia,” which announces its busi-
ness growth (6 new centers), defines the price of the ser-
vice (€1300), and predicts a 25% annual increase in services 
charged to the CIHI.
3. Although there is no answer to this proposal in the ar-
chives  of  the  CIHI  or  the  Ministry  of  Health,  the  other 
documents (correspondence between the CIHI and the 
state hospitals in 2009) witness that the CIHI “abides by 
the agreement between the Ministry and Medikol about 
Medikol’s PET/CT Project in Croatia, which is carried out by 
Medikol.” In other words, the government financially sup-
ported the monopoly of a private businessman to PET/CT 
scan services. In 2009, Rijeka University Hospital Center, 
Jordanovac Hospital for Lung Diseases, Zagreb, and Osijek 
University Hospital each request a purchase of a PET/CT 
machine from the Ministry, but are all refused with the 
explanation that Medikol is the only institution that 
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can have this machine with services contracted with the 
CIHI. This violates the Croatian regulations and is evidently 
a corrupt relationship with a private firm that made more 
than HRK 150 million profits in only four years.
4. After these facts were published in the media, we learn 
that  the  Croatian  Office  for  Corruption  and  Organized 
Crime (USKOK) is investigating the case, and that two min-
isters of health, Neven Ljubičić and Darko Milinović, claim 
that the order to sign the contract came from the former 
prime minister Ivo Sanader (3), who has been arrested and 
is now in jail in Austria. Former minister Ljubičić signed 
the first contract with Medikol in 2007, and current min-
ister Milinović has continued with the implementation of 
Medikol’s ‘Project PET/CT’ since 2008.
These are the facts that Sparrow would call “that what can 
be seen right away,” but are they the real heart of this scan-
dal? Where is that that cannot be seen – what is it that we 
have to think and really worry about?
The main issue is that the USKOK’s action and media tur-
moil come three years after Medikol made the first agree-
ment with the CIHI. This tells us that Croatia not only lacks 
any analysis of health care budget spending or precau-
tionary measures to prevent irrational and questionable 
financial outflow, but that the functioning of the legal 
system is inhibited and the system does not react when 
an irregularity or criminal offense is noticed. Any anticor-
ruption activity is missing, either before or after the dis-
covery of corruption.
Let’s put aside that this conclusion is a part of general 
public attitude about the institutions in health care and 
legal system: when somebody tries to investigate an alle-
gation of corruption or establish the political responsibil-
ity of the main actors, there are no leaders at the head of 
the health care or legal system to whom they could turn 
to, although this is the responsibility of all state institu-
tions whose job is the prevention of corruption. Not to 
mention that there are many situations similar to Medikol. 
Let’s list just some of them.
Since 1999, the Ministry of Education and Sports has been 
purchasing the best magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
machines for the Neuron Polyclinic, public daughter com-
pany  of  the  University  of  Zagreb  School  of  Medicine, 
which performs commercial MRI scans. Nobody has ever 
made an inspection to whom and how the earnings 
from these expensive scans are distributed because 
Neuron is registered as a non-profit public organization. 
The institutions of the legal system have remained passive 
even after they learned in 2007 that the CIHI pays HRK 2 
million annually for the scans performed in Neuron (4,5).
Furthermore, the Croatian state has been sending pediatric 
cardiology patients for surgeries to a private clinic in Linz (6), 
Austria, for eight years, and nobody has questioned the rea-
sons why we would not do such surgical procedures our-
selves when we have many experts, and why these services 
are persistently contracted to a single private institution.
Another example: the public (and the tax payers) do not 
know anything about 356 private health institutions that 
signed contracts with the CIHI in the last two years (7), dur-
ing which the state health care institutions have experi-
enced serious budget cuts because of rationalization and 
budget savings. Which are those private institutions? What 
are the reasons for directing budget funds to them while 
budget is cut for public institutions? Is there an explana-
tion at all? What are the funds contracted? Is there any con-
trol of how they are spent?
More questions: what is the principle for making contracts 
with private institutions for home care and physical ther-
apy (8)? Can anyone enter this network once it is closed 
or is there a monopoly established? Why are services con-
tracted for ten years?
Why do imaging machines in the public hospitals work 
with  30%  of  their  capacities  while  patients  wait  for  6 
months for scans and the state sends them to private in-
stitutions (9)?
How  come  that  the  greatest  number  of  public-private 
contracts is made at hemodialysis departments and why 
is hemodialysis perceived as a lucrative private initiative in 
health care (9)?
These and many others are all well-known cases of finan-
cial outflow from the mandatory solidarity health care in-
surance to the pockets of private businesses – the fact that 
we do not follow the money trail does not mean that were 
are not fully aware of the situation. What is needed is that 
the responsible legal body, such as the Office for Corrup-
tion and Organized Crime, takes a look into the business 
relationships between the state and the private sector.
What we can see even without legal investigation is that 
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atian experiences with the corruption in the health care 
system: the US system fights against the ingenuity of the 
private criminal firms that find ways to cheat the federal 
insurance, while in Croatia it is the administration that dic-
tates the corruptive actions and allows selected private 
businesses to work under irrationally favorable conditions. 
In other words, the Croatian public health care system con-
sciously services private businesses by providing a norma-
tive and procedural framework for them.
This brings us back to the story about Medikol: some me-
dia  suggested  that  the  Croatian  health  care  would  not 
be helped if this case was opened and the corruption re-
vealed. That this is not true is clear already from the fact 
that the leading people from medical circles who today 
publicly denounce the Medikol case have been formally or 
informally in charge of the Croatian health care system and 
have contributed to its failure. Also, the whole case is now 
reduced to individuals and their roles, political intrigue and 
financial manipulation, while the structure of the health 
care system and the role of the whole social environment 
that made this case possible are not addressed. The main 
social framework was that of changing the social contract 
for health care, training the public to believe in the efficient 
functioning of the private and public health sector, and the 
poverty of the latter, so that patients are happy when some 
private businessman ‘leans on’ the public budget and don’t 
ask questions about their tax money. Moreover, this coun-
ty has still not had a government or a minister of health, 
or any other supervising body, who would want to assess 
the current mechanisms to prevent budget losses from the 
public health sector, regardless of the health politics or po-
litical option in power.
We are so far away from this that we come again to the 
same conclusion – it is not businessmen who cheat the 
government, but the government deceives its insurers, im-
poverishes the public sector, and puts money in the hands 
of the private businesses.
Unfortunately, it seems that it is the plan of all future health 
policies to legalize such practice, ie, to support the private 
health entrepreneurship at the expense of the public sec-
tor by providing them the way out of the gray zone of cor-
ruption. In this respect, the Medikol case should remind us 
that it is the high time for all stakeholders in health care 
to try to establish some control over health care processes 
because the consequences of the lack of control are atro-
cious and deeply unjust.
References
1  Sparrow KM. License to steal. How fraud bleeds America’s health 
care system. Boulder (CO): Westview Press; 2000.
2  Škaričić N. Medikol implements the PET/CT by the directives from 
the Ministry of Health! [in Croatian]. Available from: http://www.
tportal.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/120193/Projekt-PET-CT-Medikol-provodi-
po-naputku-Ministarstva.html. Accessed: April 12, 2011.
3  karičić N. Should Milinović and Ljubičić hide behind the prime-
minister? [in Croatian]. Available from: http://www.tportal.hr/
komentari/komentatori/120514/Mogu-li-se-Milinovic-i-Ljubicic-vaditi-
na-Sanadera.html. Accessed: April 11, 2011.
4  Škaričić N. USKOK at the Medical School in Zagreb [in Croatian]. 
Slobodna Dalmacija [Print issue]. 2007 October 13, section: Croatia, 
page: 10.
5  Škaričić N. New MR for Medical School in Zagreb [in Croatian]. 
Available from: http://www.natasaskaricic.bloger.hr/post/kupnja-
mra-za-medicinski-fakultet/474750.aspx. Accessed: April 12, 2011.
6  Zenić D. Croatian patients paid millions of Euros in foreign 
hospitals [in Croatian]. Available from: http://www.
slobodnadalmacija.hr/Hrvatska/tabid/66/articleType/ArticleView/
articleId/131263/Default.aspx. Accessed. April 12, 2011.
7  Škaričić N. Is it possible that Hebrang can be a good guy? [in 
Croatian]. Available from: http://www.tportal.hr/komentari/
komentatori/119864/Je-li-moguce-da-je-Hebrang-iznenada-postao-
pozitivac.html. Accessed. April 12, 2011.
8  Gorjanski D, Gajski L, Škaričić N, Sladoljev S, Marušić M. Corruption 
in Croatian health care [in Croatian]. Osijek (Croatia): Hipokrat and 
Slagalica Foundations; 2010.
9  Anonymous. Croatian Association for Nephrology, Dialysis and 
Transplantation warns Rijeka Hospital [in Croatian]. Available from: 
http://nsdzh.hr/novosti/novosti.php/2010/08/03/hrvatsko-dru-tvo-
za-nefrologiju-dijalizu-i-transplantaciju-upozorilo-upravu-kbc-a.html. 
Accessed: April 12, 2011.